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We study the effects of interregional migration on two-earner household gross 
earnings as well as on the relative income between married and cohabiting 
couples. In particular, we examine the link between education level and 
income gains. The empirical analysis is based on longitudinal data from 
Sweden as well as on functional regional labour markets that operate as 
regional entities. Using difference-in-differences propensity score matching, 
we find that migration increases total gross household earnings and has no 
significant impact on the male/female earnings gap. We find that pre-migration 
education level is a key determinant of migration and economic outcomes and 
is also a determinant of the effect of migration on income distribution within 
the household. The positive average effect on household earnings is largely 
explained by income gains among highly-educated males. Females generally 
experience no significant income gain from migration in absolute terms. 
Females gain significantly in relative income only if they are highly educated 
and married or cohabitating with a lower-educated male.  
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Investments in human capita, including investments in health, education, and 
migration, are important for individuals, households, and for society as a 
whole. In a reasonably functioning economy, these investments are expected to 
increase the productivity of labour and welfare. They may also have 
substantial effects on income distribution between income earners within the 
household and within society in general. Investments in education and 
geographic mobility may provide opportunities to reduce income differences 
between males and females, but these investments may also reinforce existing 
income differences by asymmetrically favouring the careers of one gender.  
 
This study examines the effects of migration on total household gross earnings 
and the relative income within married or cohabitating couples in Sweden. We 
devote special attention to the link between education level and the economic 
effect of migration for the spouses, because education level is a potential 
indicator of bargaining power, which plays a decisive role in modern theories 
of intra-household income distribution (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, 2001). 
The  studies within this field of research are relevant to international trends 
such as increases in the number of dual-income households, investments in 
education,  proportions of females entering higher education, and interest in 
issues regarding gender equality.  
 
Empirical economic research on migration has typically been oriented towards 
examining the determinants of migration and, to a somewhat lesser degree, its 
effect on income for singles or couples. Only a small fraction of migration 
research has been designed to study the effects on intra-household income 
distribution. Jacobsen and Levin (2000) examine interstate migration in the 
U.S. during the 1980s and report income gains for single women only. For  Sex and Migration…  2 
married couples, they find that the economic outcome of migration is negative, 
without any effect on the relative income between spouses. Smits (2001) uses 
data on married couples in the Netherlands and finds that migration has a 
negative effect on earnings for both spouses. Smits (2001) also finds that most 
long-distance moves occur in order to accommodate the male’s career. Cooke 
(2003) studies married couples in the U.S. and finds that migration increases 
the husband’s income while leaving the wife’s income unchanged, which is 
consistent with results from an earlier American study by Sandell (1977). 
Cooke finds that this result holds even if a wife has greater earning potential 
than her husband. Nivalainen (2004) studies Finnish households and finds that 
migration largely occurs due to the demands of the husband’s career, causing 
wives to become so-called tied migrants. Employment after migration is 
examined in Nivalainen (2005). The results indicate that employment among 
the majority of men is unaffected. However, some groups of migrating 
husbands have higher employment probabilities after migration, while women 
never realise the same positive returns in employment opportunities. Taylor 
(2007) uses information about reasons for migration within the UK to find that 
a majority of couples moving for job-related reasons are motivated by the 
husband’s job opportunities. Taylor (2007) also finds that the probability of 
employment following a move is reduced more for tied movers than for non-
migrants, and this effect is especially large for women.  
 
Using data on two-earner households in Sweden, Axelsson and Westerlund 
(1998) find that migration does not affect real disposable income. Nilsson 
(2000) also examines Swedish data and concludes that migration increases the 
intra-household income gap within young households in which both spouses 
hold university-level graduate degrees. 
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The present study adds to current literature by focusing on the role of 
education and income levels for changes in internal family income distribution 
among a broad representation of dual-income households that relocate to 
another geographic labour market. Sweden provides an excellent ground for 
exploring these questions because of the high availability of data and the 
internationally high rate of labour force participation rate among women. We 
use longitudinal register data on a large sample of individuals who were 
married or cohabitating prior to and after migration. Regional labour markets 
are defined by commuting patterns between places of residence and 
workplaces, rather than by historically-defined administrative borders.   
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II gives a brief summary of 
distribution theories on families and family migration. Section III presents the 
data and methods of estimation. Section IV provides the estimation results, 
followed by a summary of findings in Section V. 
 
 
II   Income distribution within the family and migration  
 
One of the most common theoretical frameworks in economic studies of 
migration is the human capital model. In this model, individual utility varies 
across potential locations. An individual chooses to reside in the location that 
maximises utility based on location-specific costs and benefits (including the 
long-term costs for relocation). The human capital model has straightforward 
implications for a single decision-maker; for families, the decision to invest in 
migration is much more complex.  
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Within early models of family behaviour, which are often called common 
preferences models, the consensus model (Samuelson, 1956) and the altruist 
model (Becker, 1974) imply that family decisions are consistent with 
maximising a single utility function. One common feature of common 
preference models involves the pooling of incomes according to which the 
incomes of both spouses are pooled together and the allocation of expenditures 
is independent of the relative contributions by husband or wife. This means 
that a given increase in income has the same effect on family utility and 
consumer demand, irrespective of which spouse provides the income. 
Empirical evidence is generally inconsistent with this income pooling 
assumption, while more recent bargain models of family decisions seem to 
provide a more credible analysis of the migration decision than older common 
preferences models (Lundberg and Pollack, 1996).  
 
For a dual-income household, migration affects the future careers and utility of 
both spouses. Presumably, a substantial share of family migrations involves 
compromises in the sense that a particular location may be optimal for the 
family, but it would not necessarily be optimal for an individual spouse if they 
were single. The term tied migration refers to the situation in which a spouse 
moves along with his/her partner even though the individual gain from the so-
called “family optimum” is lower than the gain from the so-called “free 
optimum”. At a location that is optimal for the family, total family utility is 
maximised, and thus, the tied migrant must receive enough compensation from 
the partner to migrate and stay in the relationship (Mincer, 1978). Similarly, 
one spouse may also be a tied stayer, receiving enough compensation from the 
other spouse to remain in the present location as well as in the marriage. It is 
also possible that both spouses are tied migrants or tied stayers. 
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In a bargaining model, it is assumed that individuals maximise their own 
utility and that family behaviour is not only dependent on total family income 
ceteris paribus but also on the determinants of a payoff in case no agreement is 
reached, which is called the threat point (Lundberg and Pollak, 1996). A threat 
point can be either external (such as divorce) or internal (i.e., an inefficient 
non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage). Presumably, the most extreme 
threat point for most couples is divorce, an outcome for which the threat point 
and the bargained outcome depend on external factors such as a spouse’s 
opportunities outside the marriage. In everyday bargaining, the internal threat 
point is more relevant. A family’s consumption is assumed to depend on the 
income-earning party within the marriage in contrast to pooling-based income 
models. The bargained outcome depends upon utility at the threat point, and 
family decisions  depend on the higher-earning party within the marriage. It is 
reasonable to assume that the allocation problem has an external threat point, 
the spouses separate or divorce when they cannot agree on a residential 
location.  
 
In the human capital model according to which a single utility function is 
maximised, it is assumed that the tied mover is compensated for a loss suffered 
from migration. The cooperative bargaining models assume that all agreements 
can be reinforced and that there are no restrictions on agreements made within 
the family. Furthermore, the cooperative models always lead to Pareto efficient 
outcomes (Chiappori, 1992). It is unlikely, however, that a couple can make 
binding agreements about the future distribution of resources within a 
marriage. Lundberg and Pollak (2001) illustrate a non-cooperative two-stage 
game in which a location is determined in the first stage and the distribution of 
resources is allocated in the second stage. An investment in human capital thus 
yields different returns for the two individuals, thereby affecting bargaining 
power in future negotiations as well as each spouse’s ability to claim family  Sex and Migration…  6 
resources in the future. If it is impossible for spouses to make binding 
agreements about the future transfers of resources, the allocation problem may 
result in an inefficient outcome, such as an inefficient location or an inefficient 
divorce. An inefficient location is characterised by failing to maximise total 
household income. The tied spouse prefers a bigger piece of a smaller pie, and 
the leading spouse prefers to be married rather than being separated with a 
higher income.  
 
Modern theories seem to accommodate empirical observations that are 
inconsistent with the older common preferences and income pooling models, 
and they generate several interesting and seemingly realistic implications. 
However, it appears extremely difficult to pursue rigorous empirical tests of 
these models, and thus, we make no such aspiration.
1 The specific empirical 
questions addressed here are:  
-  Does migration yield income gain for the household as a whole?  
-  Does migration affect relative income between spouses? 
-  How do observed changes in earnings relate to education level in 
terms of relative bargaining power? 
Educational attainment is correlated with potential wage level. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to presume that education would affect a family’s location decision 
as well as any returns from migration for both parties. Moreover, bargaining 
models suggest that some covariates in empirical household models of 
migration and post-migration income may be perceived as indicators of 
bargaining power. As pointed out by Lundberg and Pollak (2001), education is 
a possible candidate in this respect.  
                                                 
1Naturally, changes in wages or incomes do not translate into changes in utility by necessity. It is, 
for example, very difficult to incorporate a complete set of relevant indicators of compensating 
wage and income differentials into empirical models. Sex and Migration… 
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III  Data and estimation 
 
Data 
We use annual panel data from various official registers from the Swedish 
National Tax Board, the National Labour Market Administration of Sweden, 
and Statistics Sweden. An advantage of this data is that spatial migration 
dimensions are delineated in terms of functional regions called Labor Market 
Areas. Created by Statistics Sweden, Labor Market Areas are based on an 
algorithm that exploits commuting flows within and between clusters of 
municipalities.  The algorithm creates a set of 89 regions during the period of 
study in which commuting flows across borders are minimised.  Since 
commuting options are limited between Labor Market Areas, migration is the 
most viable option for workers who are taking advantage of employment 
opportunities in other regions.  This makes data more amenable to studies of 
labour-related migration, as opposed historically- or politically-defined 
regions. Migration is thus defined to occur when the Labor Market Area of 
residence changes between years.
2  
 
The sample used in this study pertains to residents in Sweden who were 
between 25-45 years old in 1997 and married or cohabitants with the same 
partner during 1997 and 2003. In the register data, two individuals are 
cohabitants if they are registered at the same address and if they have a child in 
common. Registered partnerships of same-sex couples are excluded. In line 
with most previous studies, we confine the analysis to couples who remained 
married or cohabitating during the period of observation, as such couples have 
                                                 
2 This is the place of residence in December 31 according to official registers.   Sex and Migration…  8 
internalised the external effects of family ties (Mincer, 1978).
3 Using 
propensity score matching and balancing tests, we found strong indications of 
lacking comparability between moving and staying households with respect to 
the variable measuring pre-migration unemployment. For this reason, we 
confine the analysis to households with spouses that were either employed or 
outside the labour force in 1997.
4 This sample includes 125,891 couples, of 
which 1,911 migrated in 1998 or 1999. Sample means are given in Table 1, 
which distinguishes the sample by migration status and gender. For males, the 
mean of pre-migration earnings in 1997 terms is around 240,000 (SEK) for 
both movers and stayers, while the mean of post-migration earnings is higher 
among movers. The time path of average earnings for females indicates a 
slightly larger increase among migrants. Movers tend to be younger and have 
higher education than stayers, which is in line with our expectations.  
                                                 
3Couples that divorce during the period are not included. Descriptive statistics show that most 
divorces occur prior to a move and that couples that move together are not more or less likely to 
divorce. 
4 We conduct separate analysis for households experiencing unemployment in 1997; the results are 
discussed briefly in Section IV.  Sex and Migration… 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Stayers    Movers 
Variable
5 Females  Males    Females  Males 
Individual  attributes        
Gross wage earningsearnings 1997  1345.98 2426.08  1184.83  2417.62 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2000  1610.80 2841.27  1474.71  3143.56 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2001  1690.11 2923.94 
 
1612.84 3254.29 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2002  1764.26 2938.02  1700.33 3320.75 
Gross wage earningsearnings 2003  1819.99 2934.96  1797.11 3378.10 
Female earnings share 1997  0.376    0.342   
Female earnings share 2000  0.388    0.345   
Female earnings share 2001  0.394    0.363   
Female earnings share 2002  0.402    0.364   
Female earnings share 2003  0.409    0.376   
Age   35.55 37.43    33.22 34.87 
Student 1997  .051  .015    .097  .063 
Elementary school or Compulsory school .101 .169    .074 .085 
2-year secondary school  .398 .374    .224 .215 
3-year secondary school  .133 .122    .116 .119 
<3 years of university  .220 .173    .266 .223 
≥3 years of university  .143 .151 
 
.311 .319 
Ph. D  .003 .0118  .006  .036 
Farming  .011 .032 
 
.004 .021 
Manufacturing  .108 .273  .077 .196 
Construction  .013 .108 
 
.0131 .058 
Retail  .154 .238  .127 .193 
Private sector  .103 .143  .105 .166 
Public sector  .537 .171  .532 .301 
Couple attributes       
Child(ren)  .927 .927  829  .829 
Small children  .335 .335  .519 .519 
Welfare benefit  .018 .018    .049 .049 
Migration history   .031 .031    .268 .268 
Regional attributes:         
Access  -3.063 -3.063   -3.190 -3.190 
Stockholm county  .201 .201    .209 .209 
South of Sweden  .141 .141    .103 .103 
Population 402,213  402,213    387,124  387,124 
Number of observations:  123,980  123,980    1,911  1,911 
 
 
                                                 




Migration can be perceived as a treatment as compared to the non-treatment 
alternative of staying. The potential outcomes are Y1 for migration and Y0 for 
staying. For each individual, there is a pair of outcomes of which only one can 
be observed. The parameter of main interest is in this case the one which 
measures the average treatment effect on the treated, ATT = E[Y1 - Y0 | M = 1], 
where M equals 1 for migration and 0 for non-migration. Clearly, Y0 | M = 1 
(i.e., what would happen to the migrants if they had not moved) cannot be 
observed. The outcomes of a sample of stayers thus serve as an estimate for 
this counterfactual outcome. The estimated effect of treatment can be biased if 
the selection mechanism is correlated with the outcome, such as in cases in 
which migrants have attributes that make them more mobile and more 
productive in any location.  
 
Propensity score matching relies on the assumption that conditional on some 
observable characteristics X, potential outcomes are independent of the 
assignment to treatment. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that this 
conditional independence assumption also holds for some function of X; that 
is,  ) ( | 0 X p M Y ⊥ , where p(X) is the so-called propensity score and the 
probability that M = 1 given X.  A condition of common support is added, 
which is that p(X) < 1 if ATT is the parameter of interest. This guarantees that 
a non-treated match exists for each treated individual. The propensity score 
may be estimated, for example, by binomial logit or probit. 
 
We have a large set of non-migrants that is exploited to construct our 
comparison group. By using more than one individual as a counterfactual, bias 
                                                 
6 See e.g., Heckman et al., (1998).  Sex and Migration… 
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increases, but variance is reduced. When propensity scores are asymmetrically 
distributed, a kernel-based procedure is beneficial, since it only uses the 
additional observations if they actually exist. The kernel-based procedure 
matches a migrant with comparable individuals among stayers. Assuming a 
migrant with outcome  i Y  and propensity score pi, kernel matching constructs 
its counterfactual outcome,  0 ˆ Y , from non-treated individuals with pj within a 
predetermined bandwidth h of pi and attaches more importance to closer 





































Note that the weights of the kernel K sum to one.
7 The purpose of the matching 
procedure is to balance the covariates between migrants and non-migrants, 
making the distribution of the counterfactual outcome of staying the same for 
the group of migrants. The estimated effect of migration is the observed 
average difference between the outcomes of the migrants and non-migrants in 
the matched sample.  
 
In the present study, we use the method of difference-in-difference propensity 
score matching to estimate the effect of migration on household incomes and 
                                                 
7 The weight of each untreated yj is 
{} ∑
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relative incomes between spouses. By using information about the outcome 
variable before treatment, it is possible to eliminate potential bias due to time-
invariant heterogeneity.
8 The difference-in-differences estimator can be written 
as Y 1 - Y0 = (Y1t+i – Y1t) – (Y0t+i – Y0t), where the subscripts t and t+i denote 
periods of time before and after migration.
9 The outcome variable in our main 
approach is constructed as [WE1997+i - WE1997], where WE denotes real annual 
wage earnings, and i is between three and six years. We do this to distinguish 
eventual differences between immediate effects from  effects that emerge over 
a few years.  
 
We also examine the effect of migration on changes in the female share of 






















. This is also estimated after one, two, 
three and four years following the move. 
 
Propensity score matching accounts for observed heterogeneity. The 
specification of the outcome as the difference-in-differences eliminates bias 
due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that affects earnings. It should 
be noted that we take advantage of rich information on both individual and 
household characteristics. Together with the difference-in-difference approach, 
this should substantially reduce potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity. 
                                                 
8 Smith and Todd (2005) find that difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimates 
are substantially less biased than cross-sectional matching estimates. 
9 The method of matching avoids the functional form restrictions of, for example, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and also offers flexibility, as counterfactual outcomes are calculated for each 
treated individual. OLS regression techniques impose greater weight to the treatment effects for 
values of X that occur often and in cases in which the variance in M is relatively large. Given 
heterogeneous treatment effects, the OLS estimate of treatment does not correspond with ATT, and 
as pointed out by Angrist (1998), this may not necessarily be an interesting estimate for an 
economic researcher. Sex and Migration… 
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IV   Results 
 
The covariates in the estimation of the propensity score should have a causal 
effect on the probability likelihood of moving as well as on changes in income. 
A large number of attributes that according to theory and previous may affect 
both the the probability of moving and earnings, have been tested in the 
specification of the propensity score.
10 First, we estimate logit equations to 
identify which covariates influence the probability to move.
11 Second, we run 
regressions to see whether the variables from the first stage affect the 
difference in earnings and the difference in female earnings share in 1997, 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. The same set of variables is used in the 
estimations for all sub-samples. Separate tests for each sub-sample indicate 
that the matched samples are well balanced with respect to the included 
covariates. Because the distributions of estimated propensity scores are quite 
dense (namely, between 0.01 and 0.05), we have chosen a rather small 
bandwidth of 0.005. The choice of bandwidth is a trade-off between bias and 
variance. With a high bandwidth, the bias increases, and the variance 
decreases. Robustness checks using a smaller bandwidth of 0.001 and a larger 
of 0.01 indicate no substantial changes in results. 
 
A common support restriction is imposed on the treated units, and thus, 
observations on migrants with propensity scores that are larger (smaller) than 
the highest (lowest) propensity score in the control group are not matched. 
Also, the five percent of treated observations with the lowest propensity score 
of control observations are eliminated. However, relaxing the common support 
                                                 
10 The specification of the propensity scores is given in Appendix, Table A2. The propensity 
scores have been estimated for the entire sample and separately conditioned on the educational 
level of the spouses. This allows for different parameter specifications by education.  
11 Overmatching, i.e., using too many covariates to estimate the propensity score increases the 
mean squared error and may cause problems with common support (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005, 
Waernbaum 2008). We have excluded variables with p-values of .2 or above.   Sex and Migration…  14
restrictions only marginally changes the estimated results, yielding no 
implications regarding the conclusions of this study. 
 
The kernel-matching estimate of ATT for the whole sample is given in Table 
2.
12 The results indicate a positive average effect on post-migration gross wage 
earnings at the household level of about 25,700 SEK (about €2,400) four years 
after the move and about 21,400 SEK for males and  4,300 SEK for females.
13 
The definition of migration in this study makes it possible for non-mover 
couples to actually migrate in subsequent years 
 
Table 2. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration 
on gross wage earnings (in 100 SEK)  
Outcome Females  Males  Household 




























Number of couples 
Movers (off support) 
125,891 
1,911 (9) 
Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common 
support restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score 
density are removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors
14 in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
12 Stata/SE 10.1 is used for estimation. 
13 The share of the movers (stayers) in higher education in 2000 is 3.7% (1.4%) for men and 9.5% 
(7.5%) for women. The share taking parental leave in 2000 is 46.9% (38.9%) for men and 63.5% 
(55.0%) for women. When controlling for age, a substantial portion of these differences disappear. 
We expect that when controlling for educational level and other covariates, this difference 
becomes even smaller. This should not influence our results. 
14 In large samples, there is evidence that the component of the variance from the estimation of the 
propensity scores can be disregarded (Eichler and Lechner, 2002). Sex and Migration… 
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 If anything, this should bias the results downwards. The point estimates are all 
positive, indicating positive returns from migration overall. However, the 
estimated gains for females are not significantly different from zero.  
 
To see whether these results hold when conditioning on the education level of 
the spouses, which is a potential indicator of bargaining power, we carry out 
separate estimations for different educational combinations within couples in 
Tables 3 and 4. If an individual has a university education, he/she is labelled as 




Table 3. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration on 
gross wage earnings, conditional on the female having low education.
      
 Females  Males  Household 
Outcome  Male’s education  Male’s education  Male’s education 
Low High Low High Low  High 
















































Number of couples 
Movers (off support) 




Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common support 
restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score density are 
removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 3 provides the results conditioned on females having low education. 
Most estimates are statistically insignificant. Looking at the point estimates of 
                                                 
15 A separate analysis for households experiencing unemployment in 1997 provides similar results, 
but the standard errors are larger.  Sex and Migration…  16
ATT, the estimated effect between 1997 and 2000 for low-educated females 
married to low-educated males indicate a reduction in earnings of about 7,500 
SEK (a point estimate of -73.53). Low-educated females living with high-
educated males experience an estimated loss in earnings between 1997 and 
2000 of about 1,400 SEK (a point estimate of -14.38). For low-educated males 
married to low-educated females, the estimated increase in earnings is 400 
SEK (a point estimate of -4.09). The estimated effect on earnings between 
1997 and 2000 for high-educated males married to low-educated females is an 
increase of 37,700 SEK (a point estimate of is 374.33). 
 
For a low-educated female in 1997, the returns from migration for the 
household as a whole differs with respect to her male partner's education level 
(Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3). A couple in which both spouses have low 
education experiences no monetary gain. The estimates are small or negative, 
and the estimated standard errors are relatively large. A couple in which the 
male has a high level of education but the female does not receives the highest 
estimated return from migration for the household as a whole (about 55,000 
SEK); the male earnings growth of 59,000 SEK far exceeds the estimated 
female earnings reduction of more than 4,000 SEK. Again, the standard errors 
are rather large, and only the estimates of the male’s gains and total household 
earnings are statistically significant. 
 
Table 4 presents the results conditioned on a female having a university 
education. The estimated effect from migration on total household earnings is 
positive, regardless of the male’s education level, but it is only significant 
when both spouses have a high level of educational attainment. The female’s 
return is insignificant regardless of her husband’s education.  
 Sex and Migration… 
 
17
Table 4. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration on 
gross wage earnings, conditional on the female having high 
education.  
  
 Females  Males  Household 
Outcome 
Male’s education  Male’s education  Male’s education 
Low  High  Low High Low High 
















































Number of couples 
Movers (off support)




Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common support 
restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score density are 
removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
It seems that the education level of the husband is the primary determinant of 
the effect of migration on total household earnings. When both spouses have 
higher education, the total household gain from migration after four years is 
about 38,000 SEK, of which a major part is derived from the effect of the 
male’s earnings. 
 
A general impression from the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 is that the monetary 
benefit for a male with university education appears to be negatively correlated 
with the education level of his spouse. A highly-educated male living with a 
highly-educated female receives an increase in earnings that is substantially 
lower than for those living with lower-educated females (28,000 SEK as 
compared to 59,000 SEK four years after the move). For males and females 
with low education levels, the estimates indicate no statistically significant  Sex and Migration…  18
effects, and the education level of the spouse does not seem to affect the 
economic outcome of migration. 
 
Relative earnings within a household may be affected by the educational levels 
of the spouses. Table 5 gives the matching estimates of the effect on a female’s 
share of household earnings between 1997 and post-migration shares measured 
each year from 2000 to 2003.  
 
Table 5. Propensity score matching estimates of the effect of migration on the 
female’s share of total household gross wage earnings with  
Outcome  Females having low 
education 
Females having high 
education 
  Male’s education  Male’s education 

































































































Number of couples  









Note: The estimates are based on the Normal kernel with bandwidth .005 and a common support 
restriction. The 5% of observations on migrants with the lowest propensity score density are 
removed. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
When the sample is separated by education level, the signs of virtually all 
estimates are in line with the hypothesis that the relative education levels of 
spouses are indicators of bargaining power. However, the estimated effects 
pertaining to females with a lower level of education are insignificant. 
Substantial and statistically significant positive effects on a female’s share of Sex and Migration… 
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household earnings are indicated for the sample of highly-educated females 
married to lower-educated partners. For this sample, migration seems to 
increase the female share of total household earnings by around 4%. The 
estimated results for couples with highly-educated males and lower-educated 
females are negative but insignificant. This may seem puzzling, since the 
highly-educated male experiences the largest increase. The estimates for the 
total sample indicate no significant effects of migration on the female’s share 




V   Summary 
 
Our findings indicate that migration has a positive effect on total household 
gross wage earnings among married and cohabitating couples. The average 
effect is derived primarily from large earning increases among highly-educated 
males. The greatest income gains from migration are accrued by highly-
educated males married to or cohabiting with lower-educated females. In 
general, we find little evidence of positive effects of migration on earnings 
among females. Nevertheless, education level seems to be positively correlated 
with income gains among females, although the estimated effects are relatively 
small or statistically insignificant, even for highly-educated females. When 
examining the change in the female versus male shares of total household 
earnings, we find that the effect of migration is negligible. However, highly-
educated females coupled with lower-educated males experience a 4% increase 
in income share as compared to non-migrants.  
 
                                                 
16Results available upon request from the authors.  Sex and Migration…  20
Although not conclusive, we interpret our empirical findings in relation to the 
concept of tied migration as follows. The substantial gain in total income 
among migrating dual-income households implies that eventual negative 
income effects from tied migration are not large enough to fully offset the 
increases in household income caused by migration. Moreover, tied migration 
does not counteract potential income gains to an extent that incurs a decrease 
in income for either earner. This applies on average for the entire sample.  
 
Disaggregated analyses reveal that education levels affect the gains from 
migration in terms of individual earnings, total household earnings, and the 
female share of total earnings. The latter finding is, however, statistically and 
economically significant only for highly-educated females married or 
cohabitating with lower-educated males. For this group, the results support the 
hypothesis that relative education levels between spouses matters for 
bargaining power when household location decisions are made. Although 
general patterns of point estimates (that is, of earnings effects) for couples with 
other educational combinations support this hypothesis, statistical evidence 





Angrist, Joshua. 1998. Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary 
Military Service Using Social Security Data on Military Applicants, 
Econometrica 66, 249-288. 
 
Axelsson, Roger and Westerlund, Olle. 1998. A Panel Study of Migration, 
Self-Selection and Household Real Income, Journal of Population 
Economics 11, 113–126. 
 
Becker, Gary S. 1974. A theory of Social Interactions, Journal of Political 
Economy 82, 1063-1094. 
 
Caliendo, Marco and Kopeinig, Sabine. 2005. Some Practical Guidance for the 
Implementation of Propensity Score Matching. IZA Working Paper 
1588. 
 
Chiappori, Pierre Andre. 1992. Collective Labor Supply and Welfare, Journal 
of Political Economy 100, 437-467.  
 
Cooke, Thomas J. 2003. Family Migration and the Relative Earnings of 
Husbands and Wives, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographer 93, 338-349. 
 
Eichler,  Martin and Michael  Lechner. 2002. An Evaluation of Public 
Employment Programmes in the East German State of Sachsen-Anhalt, 
Labour Economics 9, 143-86. 
 
Heckman, James J.; Hidehiko Icimura and Petra E. Todd. 1998. Matching as 
an econometric Evaluation Estimator, Review of Economic Studies 65, 
261-294. 
 
Jacobsen, Joyce P. and Laurence M. Levin. 2000. The effects of internal 
migration on the relative economic status of women and men, Journal 
of Socio-Economics 29, 291-304.  Sex and Migration…  22
 
Lundberg, Shelley and Robert A. Pollak. 1996. Bargaining and Distribution in 
Marriage, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, 139-158. 
 
Lundberg, S. and Robert A. Pollak. 2001. Efficiency in Marriage, NBER 
working paper 8642, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
Mincer, Jacob. 1978. Family Migration Decisions, Journal of Political 
Economy 86, 749-73. 
 
Nilsson, Karina. 2000. Dual University-Graduate Households in Sweden: The 
Effect of Regional Variations and Migration on Income Equality, 
International Journal of Population Geography 6, 287-301. 
 
Nivalainen, Satu. 2004. Determinants of family migration: Short moves vs. 
long moves, Journal of Population Economics 17, 157-175. 
 
Nivalainen, Satu. 2005. Interregional Migration and Post Move Employment 
in Two-earner Families: Evidence from Finland, Regional Studies 39, 
891-907.  
 
Rosenbaum, Paul R. and Donald B. Rubin. 1983. The Central role of the 
Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 
Biometrika 70, 41-55. 
 
Samuelson, Paul. A. 1956. Social Indifference Curves, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70, 1-22. 
 
Sandell, Steven H. 1977. Women and the Economics of Family Migration, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 59, 406-414. 
 
Smith, Jeffery A. and Petra E. Todd. 2005. Does matching overcome 
LaLonde’s critique of non-experimental estimators?, Journal of 
Econometrics 125, 305-353.  
 Sex and Migration… 
 
23
Smits, Jeroen. 2001. Career Migration, Self-selection and the Earnings of 
Married Men and Women in the Netherlands, 1981-93, Urban Studies 
38, 541-562. 
 
Taylor, Mark P. 2007. Tied Migration and Subsequent Employment: Evidence 
from Couples in Britain, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
69, 795-818.  
 
Waernbaum, Ingeborg. 2008. Covariate selection and propensity score 
specification in causal inference. PhD Thesis, Statististical Studies 38. 
Department of Statistics, Umeå University. 
  Sex and Migration…  24
Appendix  
 
Table A1. Definitions of variables 
Individual attributes: 
Gross wage earnings 1997-2003; in hundreds of Swedish Kronor (SEK). 
Age; in 1997. 
Child(ren); couple has at least one child below the age of 18 living at home. 
Small children; couple only has children under the age of seven living at home.
Student; individual received study aid for higher education or adult education. 
Educational level; highest level of education attained by 1997. 
Sector; sector of work in 1997 according to the Industry code (sni92) as 
defined by Statistics Sweden. 
Welfare benefit; family received benefit in 1997. 




Access; total employment in adjacent labour market regions, weighted by 
distance between regional centres. 
Stockholm; couple lived in Stockholm county in 1997.  
South of Sweden; couple lived in Skåne or Blekinge county in 1997. 














 Sex and Migration… 
 
25
Table A2. Estimation results 
Variable  Logit estimation of 
migration in 1998 or 1999 
Regression on difference in total 















































































































Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. Male and female attributes are indicated with (M) and (F), 
respectively. 
  